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BOUNDED BY THE CONSTITUTION: RESOLVING THE PRIVATE
SEARCH DOCTRINE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Mark Kifarkis
This Article analyzes the private search doctrine exception to the
Fourth Amendment and the exception's application to smart phones and
computers. The private search doctrine allows governmental authorities to
replicate a private individual's search without obtaining a warrant. This
Article proposes a standard for court's to use to resolve the circuit split on
how to apply the exception to today's technology. Presently, there are two
standards used by courts. The Article names one standard as the "boundless
search approach" that is used by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. The Article
names the other standard as "bounded search approach" that is used by Sixth
and Eleventh Circuits. The Article proposes courts to use the bounded search
approach when reviewing matters regarding the private search doctrine, and
an alternative approach that this Article names the "severity of the crime
approach."
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INTRODUCTION
The amount of private and personal data that can be stored on a
smartphone is extraordinary. One of the top-selling smartphones in the world
has the capacity to hold 81 films, 229 television shows, 19,125 photos, or
4,080 applications.1 Technology companies understand the amount of personal data that could be stored on a smartphone and have resisted demands
from the government to unlock phones of alleged terrorists, due to the
“chilling” effect such a breach of privacy might have.2 However, a person
does not need to be in the technology industry to understand the vast amount
of data a smartphone can hold and the number of uses a smartphone can have.
In Riley v. California, the United States Supreme Court observed that
smartphones “could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes,
calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or
newspapers,” and in fact labeled smartphones “minicomputers.”3 Throughout
the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts describes smartphones as having immense
storage capacity, where a 16-gigabyte smartphone has the ability to hold
“millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.”4
Having smartphones in the palms of people’s hands has benefited society in
many aspects of daily life, including business, education, health, and social
life.5 Because smartphones are such an integral part of our lives, keeping the
information on those devices private is a great concern.6
1

David Price, What’s the True Formatted Storage Capacity of an iPhone, iPad or iPod?,
MACWORLD (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.macworld.co.uk/feature/ipad/whats-iphone-ipodipads-true-formatted-storage-capacity-3511773/.
2
Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San Bernardino Gunman’s
iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/technology/ap
ple-timothy-cook-fbi-san-bernardino.html.
3
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
4
Id.
5
Muhammad Sarwar & Tariq Rahim Soomro, Impact of Smartphone’s on Society, 98 EUR.
J. SCI. RES. 216, 218 (2013).
6
Id. at 224.
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Privacy is an issue that many Americans believe is important: they
believe that they should be able to maintain privacy and confidentiality in the
commonplace activities of their lives.7 The fear of privacy invasions relating
to smartphones is significant, considering that nearly 50% of American adults
own a smartphone. 8 Though the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution protects against unreasonable search and seizure,9 the circuits
are split on how to apply those protections to computers through a concept
known as the private search doctrine.10 The various court holdings on either
side of this split can be similarly applied to smartphones. Smartphone
chipmaker ARM believes that, with their newly announced chips, individuals
will be able to do all the tasks that currently require a computer. 11
Considering the downward trend of the PC industry and the continued growth
of smartphones, it is only a matter of time before smartphones replace
computers and tablets.12
Furthermore, the Court in Riley only briefly discussed the technology
that is known as “cloud computing.” In dicta, Chief Justice Roberts stated
that “officers searching a phone’s data would not typically know whether the
information they are viewing was stored locally at the time of the arrest or
has been pulled from the cloud.”13 The Court went on to compare a search of
cloud-based storage through a cell phone to “finding a key in a suspect’s

7

Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and
Surveillance, PEW RES. CTR. (May 20, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/amer
icans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/. In fact, in a 2015 survey, 95% of
adults stated that being in control of who can get information about them is important and
74% felt that it was very important. Id. Ninety percent of the adults surveyed that controlling
what information is collected about them is important and 65% thought it was very important.
Id.
8
The Editorial Board, Smartphones and the 4th Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/28/opinion/smartphones-and-the-4th-amendment.html.
9
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10
Orin Kerr, 11th Circuit Deepens the Circuit Split on Applying the Private Search Doctrine
to Computers, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/12/02/11th-circuit-deepens-the-circuit-split-on-applying-the-privatesearch-doctrine-to-computers/?utm_term=.882a2009d672.
11
Christina Bonnington, In Less Than Two Years, a Smartphone Could Be Your Only
Computer, WIRED (Feb. 10, 2015, 3:42 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/02/smartphoneonly-computer/.
12
Id. Based on the similarities between computers and smartphones, when this Article
applies a doctrine to computers it also applies the doctrine to smartphones.
13
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
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pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock and search a
house.”14
Applying the Fourth Amendment to society’s advanced technology
has challenged the courts. 15 Because computers and smartphones have
similar capabilities and storage, the same standard should be applied to both
technologies.16 Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the Fourth
Amendment and the warrantless search exception known as the private search
doctrine. Part II of this Article discusses the current circuit split between the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits on one hand and the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits
on the other, concerning what standard to apply to computers and
smartphones. Lastly, Part III of this Article offers a resolution to the circuit
split that presently exists regarding the applicable standards for smartphones
and computers, by adopting what this Article calls the “bounded search
approach.” If the courts reject this approach, Part III profits an alternative
approach to resolving the circuit split that considers the severity of the crime
to determine which approach should be applied in a given scenario.
I.
A.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE
Brief Introduction to the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for
“the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” 17 Furthermore, the
Fourth Amendment requires that warrants shall be issued only upon showing
probable cause and describing the place to be searched or persons or things
to be seized.18 The Fourth Amendment has an extensive case law history:19
in the most seminal case, United States v. Katz, the Supreme Court held that
14

Id.
Kelly A. Borchers, Mission Impossible: Applying Arcane Fourth Amendment Precedent
to Advanced Cellular Phones, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 223, 225 (2005).
16
Id. at 257.
17
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18
Id.
19
See e.g., A Selection of Supreme Court Cases Involving the Fourth Amendment & the Body,
A.B.A.,
https://search.americanbar.org/search?q=A+Selection+of+Supreme+Court+Cases+Involvin
g+the+Fourth+Amendment+%26+the+Body&client=default_frontend&proxystylesheet=d
efault_frontend&site=default_collection&output=xml_no_dtd&oe=UTF-8&ie=UTF8&ud=1&getfields=gsaentity_aba_collection (follow “[MS WORD] A Selection of
Supreme Court” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
15
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a search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of
privacy that society considers objectively reasonable. 20 This is otherwise
known as the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. 21 The test to
determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy has
two prongs: one that is subjective and one that is objective.22 The subjective
prong requires a reasonable expectation in the mind of the defendant, while
the objective prong requires that society must consider the defendant’s
subjective expectation of privacy to be reasonable. 23 In Katz, the Court
rejected the notion that only certain physical areas are constitutionally
protected and established the dual prong reasonable expectation of privacy
test.24
Although a warrant is typically required by authorities to perform a
Fourth Amendment search, certain exceptions allow the government to
circumvent the warrant requirement.25 In Katz, the Court stated:
“Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate
of the (Fourth) Amendment requires adherence to the judicial
process” . . . and that searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment–subject only to
a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions.26
The Court created an exception to this rule in Riley, holding that a warrantless
search could be permitted through balancing “on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy, and on the other hand, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”27 Another exception is the third-party doctrine, which states:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
[g]overnment authorities, even if the information is revealed
20

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
Id.
22
Borchers, supra note 15.
23
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
24
Michael Wukmer, Comment, The Fourth Amendment Following Private Searches: Is
There a Privacy Interest to Protect?, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 172, 176–80 (1983).
25
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
26
Id. (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)).
27
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
21
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on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not
be betrayed.28
Other well-established exceptions, including searches incident to a lawful
arrest, searches authorized by consent, hot pursuit, plain view observation,
and customs searches, were created by the Court because the Court
determined in each case that not all warrantless searches are unreasonable.29
The private search doctrine should stand amidst these various exceptions.
B.

The Private Search Doctrine

The protection provided through the Fourth Amendment and the
Constitution only insulate the public from government actions.30 The Fourth
Amendment’s “origin and history clearly shows that it was intended as a
restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to
be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies.”31 Thus, if a search
or seizure was carried out by a private citizen who was not acting as an agent
of the government, the Fourth Amendment would not apply, regardless of the
unreasonableness of the search.32
Under the private search doctrine, governmental authorities may
retrace a private individual’s search without obtaining a warrant 33 because
the owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy has already been breached.34
The private search doctrine finds its roots in United States v. Jacobsen.35 For
a search to fall within the private search doctrine the government must
establish that: (1) the government did not influence the private citizen to
conduct the search, and (2) the subsequent governmental search did not
exceed the scope of the private search.36 The Fourth Amendment limitations
will be fulfilled if the government meets these two elements. The following
sections analyze each element of the private search doctrine.
28

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
Kim A. Lambert, United States v. Jacobsen: Expanded Private Search Doctrine
Undermining Fourth Amendment Values, 16 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 364–65 (1985).
30
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
31
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
32
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
33
United States v. Spicer, 432 F. App’x 522, 523 (6th Cir. 2011).
34
Andre MacKie-Mason, The Private Search Doctrine After Jones, 126 YALE L.J.F. 326
(2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-private-search-doctrine-after-jones.
35
Spicer, 432 F. App’x at 523.
36
Wukmer, supra note 24, at 176–80.
29
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1.
Governmental influence upon the private search. The first
prong of the private search doctrine requires a court to determine if the
government was involved in or influenced the private search.37 In order for
there to be government influence or involvement, the government authorities
need not actually be present at the time and place of the citizen’s search.38 No
bright line test reveals when the government involvement goes too far. 39
Rather, the courts adjudicate Fourth Amendment challenges on a case-bycase basis, examining the particular facts of each case to determine whether
government influence necessitates application of the Fourth Amendment.40
For example, searches conducted by a private person who was encouraged or
directed by government officials and searches where the private person is
actually an informant constitute sufficient government influence to implicate
the Fourth Amendment.41 Two critical factors in assessing whether a private
party acts as an agent of the government are: (1) the government’s knowledge
of and acquiescence to the search, and (2) the intent of the party performing
the search.42
United States v. Parker provides an example of governmental
influence that is insufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment in a private
search. In Parker, a UPS employee opened a package that was insured for
$4,000, to ensure it conformed to UPS’s policy for packages insured for more
than $1,000.43 The UPS employee discovered $4,000 in the case and notified
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which then
asked UPS to ship the package and notify them of any return package. 44
However, the DEA never inspected the package.45 UPS then informed the
DEA of a return package and delivered it to the DEA’s office.46 There, a drug
dog indicated the package contained narcotics.47 The DEA then obtained a
37

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117.
WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 2:3 (2d ed.
2017).
39
United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2003).
40
Id.
41
Ringel, supra note 38.
42
United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v.
Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982)).
43
United States v. Parker, 32 F.3d 395, 397 (8th Cir. 1994).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
38
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warrant to open the package and found over 100 grams of
methamphetamine. 48 On appeal, the defendants argued that UPS was
operating as an agent of the government when UPS employees cooperated
with the DEA, since the employees’ actions furthered only the interests of the
government.49 The DEA countered that no government entity directed UPS
to open the first package; UPS opened the package pursuant to its own
company policy.50 The Eighth Circuit sided with the DEA, holding that UPS
opened the package on their own accord with no influence from the
government, and the DEA opened the package only after it had obtained a
search warrant. 51 In Parker, the DEA did not go beyond the scope of the
private search because it did not handle the first package at all, and it did not
open the second package until it obtained a search warrant. Had the DEA
opened and searched the second package without obtaining a search warrant,
it would have expanded the scope of the private search by doing more than
the employee did, which would have implicated the Fourth Amendment.
Where the government influences or encourages private parties to
conduct searches, the searches may fall outside the private search doctrine
and, thus, be subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Governmental
influence on a private party defeats the idea that a private search is truly
conducted by a private party: rather, it is a private party conducting a search
at the behest of the government. This scenario is evident in Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives’ Ass’n. The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 authorized
the Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe, as necessary, appropriate rules,
regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad safety,” after data
revealed that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad employees posed a serious
threat to public safety. 52 The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
subsequently circulated regulations that mandated blood and urine tests of
employees who were involved in certain train accidents and that authorized,
but did not require, railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees
who violated certain rules.53

48

Id.
Id. at 398.
50
Id. at 399.
51
Id.
52
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989).
53
Id.
49
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Skinner required the Supreme Court to determine whether these blood
and urine test regulations violated the Fourth Amendment.54 The Court held
that a search is not automatically private if the government has not compelled
a private party to perform the search.55 In Skinner, the specific features of the
regulations convinced the Court that the government did more than adopt a
passive position toward the underlying private conduct by the railroad
companies. 56 The Court recognized government influence because the
regulations set forth in Subpart D by the FRA pre-empted state laws, rules,
or regulations covering the same subject matter and were intended to
supersede any provision of a collective bargaining agreement or arbitration
award construing such an agreement.57 Furthermore, the Court found that the
regulations also conferred upon the FRA the right to receive certain
biological samples and test results procured by railroads pursuant to Subpart
D.58 Finally, a railroad could not divest itself of, or otherwise compromise by
contract, the authority conferred by Subpart D. 59 In light of all these
provisions, the Court was unwilling to accept the government’s argument that
the tests conducted by private railroads in reliance on Subpart D were
primarily the result of private initiative, because the government removed all
legal barriers to the testing and had made plain not only its strong preference
for testing, but also its desire to share the fruits of such intrusions.60
Based upon these two cases, it is clear that the private search doctrine
applies only when governmental authorities do not influence or compel a
private citizen to conduct the search on behalf of the government. Essentially,
if the government has encouraged, endorsed, or participated in any way in a
search conducted by a private citizen, a court will find that there is enough
governmental influence to implicate the Fourth Amendment.

54

Id. at 614.
Id. at 615.
56
Id.
57
Id. Subpart D authorizes but does not require railroads to administer breath or urine tests
or both to covered employees who violate certain safety rules. Id. Furthermore, Subpart D
makes plain a strong preference for testing and a governmental desire to share the fruits of
such intrusions and the regulation mandates that railroads not bargain away their Subpart D
testing authority. Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
55
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2.
Scope of the search. The second prong of the private search
doctrine requires that the scope of the governmental authority’s search must
not exceed the scope of the private party’s search. Three cases clearly
illustrate the contours of this prong. In United States v. Jacobsen, the
employees of a private freight carrier noticed a white powdery substance that
was originally concealed within eight layers of wrappings. 61 The employees
called a federal agent, who tested the powder using a chemical test that
revealed the powder was cocaine. 62 The Supreme Court was tasked with
determining if, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the agent was required to
obtain a warrant before he tested the substance.63 The Court held that once a
private search has been performed, it eradicates the individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.64 Once this happens, “the Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit governmental use of the now non-private information.” 65
However, once the governmental authorities conduct their own search, they
must not exceed the scope of the private search without obtaining a warrant.66
The second case, Walter v. United States, best illustrates the issue of
police exceeding the scope of the private search.67 In Walter, employees of
L’Eggs Products, Inc. opened a dozen cartons of homosexual motion pictures
that were accidentally shipped to them and found that the individual boxes
depicted suggestive drawings and explicit descriptions of the contents. 68
After an employee opened one or two of the boxes and attempted to view the
film, the employees called the FBI. 69 Upon retrieving the packages, the
agents viewed the films without obtaining a warrant, and the petitioners were
indicted with obscenity charges.70
The Court explained that, if the results of the private search are in
plain view when the materials are turned over to the government, the
government may justify their re-examination of the materials; however, the

61

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 117.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 116.
67
32 LEONARD N. ARNOLD, N.J. PRACTICE SERIES, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
16:29 (2016–2017 ed.).
68
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651–52 (1980).
69
Id. at 652.
70
Id.
62
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government may not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the
right to make an independent search.71
In determining whether police officers have exceeded the
scope of a private search a court should inquire whether the
government learned something from the police search that it
could not have learned from the private searcher’s testimony
and, if so, whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in that information.72
The Court found that the government action, viewing the films, was a
significant expansion of the private party’s initial search because the private
party had not actually watched the films.73 The Court therefore characterized
the government viewing the films as a separate search.74
United States v. Miller further illustrates the private search doctrine’s
scope requirement. In Miller, an employee at a mental illness treatment
facility went to the apartment of a patient to give the patient medication, but
the employee forgot that the patient was out of town.75 Upon entering the
patient’s room using the master key, the employee smelled cigarette smoke,
which caused concern because of the facility’s strict no smoking rule.76 The
employee saw evidence of both cigarette usage and drug activity all lying out
in plain view, and reported what she saw to the director who then called the
police.77 Upon responding to the director’s call, police officers observed only
the evidence that the employee saw.78 Based on the officers’ observations,
the police obtained a search warrant.79 The defendant appealed, arguing that
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated; the government countered
arguing third-party consent overcame the Fourth Amendment issue.80 The
Eighth Circuit, sua sponte, held that the facility employees’ search
unquestionably constituted a valid private search. 81 Also, the circuit court
71

Id. at 657.
Ringel, supra note 38.
73
Walter, 447 U.S. at 657.
74
Id.
75
United States v. Miller, 152 F.3d 813, 814–15 (8th Cir. 1998).
76
Id. at 815.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 816.
72
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held that the police did not participate in or influence the employees’ entry,
and once the police became involved, their intrusion went no further than the
private search.82 The fact that the police became involved did not implicate
the Fourth Amendment in Miller because the police’s intrusion did not
exceed the scope of the private search conducted by the facility employees.
It is important to note that there are circumstances where a court is
unable to determine whether the government agent exceeded the scope of the
private search.83 In United States v. D’Andrea, a tipster called a child abuse
hotline and informed the Massachusetts Department of Social Services (DSS)
that she had received a message on her mobile phone that contained
photographs of the defendants performing sexual acts on D’Andrea’s eightyear-old daughter and photos of the daughter’s exposed genitalia. 84 The
tipster advised DSS how to access the pictures through the mobile phone
provider’s website.85 DSS agents reported it to the local police department.86
Upon accessing the website, DSS agents found numerous pornographic
pictures of D’Andrea’s daughter.87 However, due to the record’s miniscule
detail surrounding the scope of the private search, the Court lacked sufficient
evidence to determine whether DSS expanded the scope of the private
search.88
These cases show how both prongs of the private search doctrine
operate. The requirements of no government influence on the private search
and no government search beyond the scope of the private search provide an
adequate framework even in our rapidly evolving technological era. The next
section analyzes the problems of applying the doctrine to smartphones and
computers.

82

Id.
See United States v. D’Andrea, 648 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that “the record [did]
not provide enough meaningful details on the searches of the websites by the Tipster and the
DSS, . . .[the court did] not have enough evidence to determine whether the DSS search of
the website exceeded the scope of the tipster’s search”).
84
Id. at 3–4.
85
Id. at 4.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 9.
83
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THE COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE TO
SMARTPHONES AND COMPUTERS

The private search doctrine presents a whole new set of problems
when it is applied to technology. The primary question that arises is, “when
a private party searches a computer, sees a suspicious file and reports the
finding to the police, what kind of government search of the computer counts
as merely reconstructing the private search and what kind of search counts as
exceeding the private search?”89 This is a difficult issue to answer because
the courts face a number of alternatives: “what’s the right measuring unit to
use – the data, the file, the folder, the physical device, or something else?”90
An analogous situation exists when the police enter a house: can they search
everything inside the house or only what is visible? “The opening of any
closed containers inside the house constitutes a separate search.”91 A “closed
container” is analogous to a smartphone with multiple photo albums on its
camera. Each album is a “closed container” and opening the album would
constitute a new search. Courts battling this issue have developed different
methods of resolving exactly how much can be searched. Particularly, courts
have established two types of standards: the single unit approach (hereinafter
called the “boundless” search approach), and the folder approach (hereinafter
called the “bounded” search approach).92
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits apply the boundless search approach
when governmental authorities search a technological device based on the
private search doctrine.93 Thus, both circuits reject the idea that each album,
or folder on a computer, is a closed container that constitutes a new search.
Instead, these circuits see the device as one container, meaning that one
search is all that is needed. On the other hand, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits
apply the bounded search approach when governmental authorities search a
89

Kerr, supra note 10.
Orin Kerr, Sixth Circuit Creates Circuit Split on Private Search Doctrine for Computers,
WASH. POST (May 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/w
p/2015/05/20/sixth-circuit-creates-circuit-split-on-private-search-doctrine-forcomputers/?utm_term=.60befdca9a6f.
91
Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 554
(2005).
92
Joel Varner, Computers, the Private Search Doctrine, and the Fourth Amendment, MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV., http://mttlr.org/2015/11/05/computers-the-private-search-doc
trine-and-the-fourth-amendment/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
93
Kerr, supra note 10.
90
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device using the private search doctrine.94 The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits
believe that if authorities want to view a new album on a smartphone, or a
separate folder on the computer that was not searched by the private search,
then a warrant is required because the governmental authorities are bounded
to the scope of the private search.
A.

The Boundless Search Approach

The boundless search approach, or single unit approach, adopted by
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits allows governmental authorities to search the
entire device or computer. 95 Hence, the authorities are boundless in their
search. For example, if a citizen conducts a private search on a smartphone
and views only one album of photos out of dozens of albums, the boundless
search approach allows governmental authorities to view the contents of the
entire smartphone, including all the photos stored in it, not just the one
specific album the private citizen viewed. Even though the private citizen
may not have viewed each image that was on the smartphone, the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits agree that this approach properly balances the governmental
interest in potential information to be gained from the search with the
smartphone owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the device. 96
Following this reasoning, these circuits feel that the government’s potential
ability to gather information outweighs a citizen’s reasonable expectation of
privacy in their personal electronics.
Questions regarding the scope of the government search arise when
the boundless search approach is adopted. However, even though the
governmental authorities’ search is more thorough than the private search and
covers areas that were not viewed by the citizen, the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits agree that the governmental search does not exceed the scope of the
private search.97 Accordingly, the search of the entire device complies with
the Fourth Amendment, under the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ interpretation
of the private search doctrine.
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1.
Fifth Circuit – United States v. Runyan. Generally, courts
have agreed that governmental searches, initiated by a private search, of
computers, smartphones, or other electronic devices must conform to the
bounded search approach.98 However, the Fifth Circuit adopted the boundless
search approach for Fourth Amendment purposes to a computer disk
containing multiple files. 99 The seminal case for the Fifth Circuit that
established its adoption of the boundless search approach arises from United
States v. Runyan.100
In Runyan, the defendant’s ex-wife was retrieving her personal
property from the defendant’s ranch when she and a companion found
pornographic photographs they believed to be of a teenager.101 The two also
removed a computer and various electronic storage devices. 102 Her
companion then examined several of the storage devices and discovered that
some contained images of child pornography, leading the companion to
contact the sheriff’s department.103 Through the course of several weeks, the
authorities searched additional material from the sources that were turned
over by the defendant’s ex-wife and her companion—material that was not
searched in the private searches.104
On its face, the search that the authorities conducted exceeded the
scope of the private search that the ex-wife and her companion had originally
conducted, and thus would violate the Fourth Amendment. But the Fifth
Circuit took the position that “police do not exceed the private search when
they examine more items within a closed container than did the private
searchers.” 105 The closed container was the computer’s hard drive, and
because the private search exposed some of the files from the container, it left
the remaining files, which were not viewed during the private search, open to
further inspection. 106 The court reasoned that the authorities were only
expanding the prior private search when they opened different files and thus
98
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did not exceed the scope of the private search because the search was still
defined by the physical storage devices.107 The court ruled:
[P]olice exceed the scope of a prior private search when they
examine a closed container that was not opened by the private
searchers unless the police are already substantially certain of
what is inside that container based on the statements of the
private searchers, their replication of the private search, and
their expertise.108
Based on the authorities’ conversations with the defendant’s ex-wife
regarding the disks she searched and their contents, the police did not exceed
the scope of the private search because they were substantially certain what
the disks contained.109
However, the court did say the police exceeded the scope of the search
when they examined disks that the ex-wife and her companion had never
examined at all. The court stated:
Any evidence that police obtained from a closed container that
was unopened by prior private searchers will be suppressed
unless they can demonstrate to a reviewing court that an
exception to the exclusionary rule is warranted because they
were substantially certain of the contents of the container
before they opened it.110
Therefore, the court found that “[t]he police could not have concluded with
substantial certainty that all of the disks contained child pornography based
on knowledge obtained from the private searchers, information in plain view,
or their own expertise.”111 Apart from the disks the ex-wife examined, there
was no evidence as to what the other disks contained (e.g., there were no
labels or markings on the disks): thus, the police exceeded the scope of the
private search.112
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2.
Seventh Circuit – Rann v. Atchison. The Seventh Circuit
agrees with the Fifth Circuit’s position that the boundless search approach
should apply when authorities search a computer or smartphone.113 The court
in Rann v. Atchison adopted the Fifth Circuit’s view in Runyan and broadly
construed the scope of the private search doctrine. 114 In Atchison, the
defendant’s 15-year-old daughter reported to police that her father, the
defendant, had both sexually assaulted and taken pornographic pictures of
her. 115 After being interviewed by the police, she went back home and
procured a digital camera memory card from her parents’ bedroom and
provided it to the police, who subsequently downloaded images depicting the
alleged sexual assault.116 Additionally, the victim’s mother brought the police
a computer ZIP drive that contained additional pornographic images of the
defendant’s daughter and stepdaughter.117 The defendant was convicted on
two counts of sexual assault and one count of possession of child
pornography.118 On appeal, the court was tasked with resolving whether the
police went beyond the scope of the private search.119
The Seventh Circuit took the same view as the Fifth Circuit in Runyan
and held that, when the private party has searched a single file, the entire
physical device is subject to being searched by the government without a
warrant. 120 The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Runyan was persuasive to the
Seventh Circuit, which adopted it because “[a] defendant’s expectation of
privacy with respect to a container unopened by the private searchers is
preserved unless the defendant’s expectation of privacy in the contents of the
container has already been frustrated because the contents were rendered
obvious by the private search.”121
Essentially, the test goes back to Katz to determine if the defendant
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the device. In the eyes of the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits, the defendant fails the objective prong of Katz because
113
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the court says there is no reasonable expectation of privacy once a private
party has searched a file on the device. Thus, even if the party has not
searched any other files on the device, the search of a single file renders the
owner’s expectation of privacy in any material on the device unreasonable. It
is not the subjective prong of Katz that fails, because it is reasonable to argue
that the defendant would still have a subjective reasonable expectation of
privacy in the remaining disks or files after one of them has been open.
In Atchinson, the court held that it was reasonable that the police knew
the digital media devices contained evidence because both the daughter and
the mother brought devices to support the sexual assault allegations.122 The
daughter knew that the defendant has taken pornographic pictures of her and
brought the police a memory card that contained those pictures, and the
mother brought a ZIP drive containing pornographic pictures of her daughter
to support the daughter’s allegations. 123 The defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the devices, and therefore, the Fourth Amendment
does not apply.124
Thus, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ objective in allowing the
boundless search approach is to support the governmental authorities in
obtaining evidence against the defendant by allowing the authorities to search
the entire device. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ view is that once a private
search has been conducted on a device, there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in that device any longer, thereby allowing authorities to search the
entire device. The boundless search approach adopted by the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits is beneficial to governmental-authority: the gathering of
potential evidence outweighs any expectation of privacy the owner may have.
B.

The Bounded Search Approach

The private search doctrine, after Runyan and Atchison, appeared to clearly
encompass the boundless search approach.125 However, the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits did not adopt the boundless search approach; rather, they
adopted the approach dubbed the bounded search approach. In 2012, the
Sixth Circuit held that the proper approach was to view the data on the
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device as separate files rather than a single data unit.126 This approach was
subsequently adopted by the Eleventh Circuit as well.127 Under the bounded
search approach, if the private search is performed on a smartphone or
computer and the private party only opens one specific image or file on the
device, then the authorities are bound by the private search and can only
open that one image or file. This is in contrast to the boundless search
approach, in which there is no question that the authorities would have the
ability to search the entire smartphone or computer, regardless of which
files were opened by the private party.
1.
Sixth Circuit – United States v. Lichtenberger. The Sixth
Circuit case that adopts the bounded search approach is United States v.
Lichtenberger. In Lichtenberger, the defendant’s girlfriend accessed his
laptop and began to open different folders, eventually finding child
pornography.128 She then proceeded to show her mother, and the two viewed
several more sexually explicit images involving minors before contacting the
police. 129 Upon arriving at the residence, the police officer asked the
defendant’s girlfriend to show him the pictures on the laptop.130 She showed
the officer random photos from several folders.131 The defendant’s girlfriend
later testified that she was not sure if the pictures she showed to the officer
were among the same pictures she had seen in her original search.132 The
court held that the search by the officer, in which he instructed the
defendant’s girlfriend to go through the computer again, exceeded the scope
of the initial private search. 133 The court held that the officer “must have
virtual certainty that reproducing the search will not reveal anything the
[officer] did not already know.”134 Because the defendant’s girlfriend did not
show the officer the exact same images she already viewed, the court
reasoned that the officer did not have virtual certainty that he would not have
seen something unrelated to the child pornography.135
The defendant argued that the private search was unconstitutional
because the girlfriend was acting as an agent of the state, and not because the
126
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scope of the second search exceeded the original search.136 The Sixth Circuit,
although agreeing with the district court’s conclusion of suppressing the
evidence, disagreed with this agency approach.137 There was no question that
the initial search was private, but the district court erred by determining
whether the defendant’s girlfriend acted as an agent of the state instead of
analyzing the scope of the search itself.138 The Sixth Circuit found this to be
an error, yet still suppressed the evidence because the search exceeded the
scope of the initial private search.139
Under the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ approach, the officer’s search
would have been within the scope of the private search, because the search
was conducted on the same device as the private search. Thus, even though
the officer viewed images that the private searcher did not, it would still be
within the scope of the private search under the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’
holdings. However, the Sixth Circuit adopted the bounded search approach
because of the sensitive nature of the computer, in order to protect private
information by limiting governmental authorities’ ability to perform such
searches without a warrant.
2.
Eleventh Circuit – United States v. Sparks. In the most recent
decision on these doctrines, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the bounded search
approach in United States v. Sparks, bolstering the circuit split by holding
that law enforcement is limited to viewing files that a private search has
already viewed.140 Defendants Johnson and Sparks left their cell phone at a
Wal-Mart store where an employee searched the contents of the passwordless phone and discovered child pornography.141 The employee showed her
fiancé the images, and he scrolled through the thumbnails and viewed a few
full size images and a video.142 After their private search, the couple gave the
phone to police officers, whereupon a Sergeant O’Reilly then viewed the
thumbnails that the fiancé had viewed, the video that the fiancé viewed, and
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one additional video that was not viewed in the private search. 143 The
defendants contended that Sergeant O’Reilly’s warrantless search of the cell
phone violated their Fourth Amendment rights because he was not within the
scope of the search that the private citizens conducted.144
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the defendants and held that the
search by law enforcement was an illegal search because the officer viewed
more files than the private search.145 In deciding to adopt the bounded search
approach, the Eleventh Circuit found that Sergeant O’Reilly’s search was
within the scope of the private search when O’Reilly viewed the photos and
video that the couple previously viewed.146 Thus, the Fourth Amendment was
not violated.147 However, when O’Reilly viewed the second video, which the
couple never viewed, he exceeded the scope of the private search and violated
the Fourth Amendment.148 The Eleventh Circuit appeared to be influenced by
how much information can be stored on the cell phone and the private nature
of a cell phone. 149 The court even relied on Riley, a non-private search
doctrine case. 150 The Eleventh Circuit “stressed the intrusiveness of
searching the personal electronic devices, as does Riley, and [held] that a
warrantless government search cannot exceed the specified files viewed in a
prior private search.”151
In summary, the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits err on the side of privacy
when it comes to the private search doctrine. On the other hand, the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits err on the side of law enforcement efficiency when it comes
to the private search doctrine. Until the United States Supreme Court decides
to hear a case on the private search doctrine, the circuit split will remain and
uncertainty will continue as to which method will be adopted by the other
circuits—the bounded approach or the boundless approach.
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COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE BOUNDED SEARCH APPROACH WHEN
REVIEWING MATTERS REGARDING THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE

To resolve the circuit split regarding which approach a court should
use when applying the private search doctrine, the Supreme Court should
adopt the bounded approach in order to protect the individual’s privacy. Both
approaches have their positives and negatives. The boundless approach
allows authorities to inspect the entire cell phone. The primary positive for
this approach is that it allows law enforcement to gather additional
information beyond what is revealed in the private search, thus potentially
preventing further crimes including, in the extreme case, potential terrorist
attacks. However, law enforcement is able to gather additional information
from the entire device at the expense of the owner’s privacy. For example, if
law enforcement conducts a search based upon the private search doctrine,
but exceeds the scope of the private search only to find photos of the owner’s
family, the owner’s privacy has been completely breached with no benefit
realized by law enforcement. The boundless approach allows law
enforcement to view all of “the privacies of life” that people store on their
smartphones.152 Furthermore, exceeding the scope of the private search could
potentially reveal evidence of an additional crime that is unrelated to the
search. Typically, a warrant would be required to find such information, but
the boundless search approach allows law enforcement to search without
violating the Fourth Amendment. The possibilities of abuse and opportunities
for law enforcement to entertain a fishing expedition for whatever they can
find are limitless.
On the other hand, the bounded approach protects the privacy of the
individual, particularly in cases where the smartphone does not have any
additional information related to the crime. Taking the same example that is
stated above, but using the bounded search approach, law enforcement would
not be able to access “the privacies of life” that could be contained on a
smartphone. If law enforcement exceeds the scope of the private search, they
violate the Fourth Amendment. The bounded approach protects the
individual’s privacy and, perhaps more importantly, it prevents officers from
abusing their power and going on a fishing expedition to gather additional
evidence of new crimes that are unrelated to the private search. As technology
continues to improve exponentially, there must be a balance between
152
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government overreach and privacy rights. One way to prevent government
overreach is by having the courts uniformly adopt the bounded approach.
This will protect the individual’s privacy rights when all “the privacies of
life” are stored on one device.
A.

The Bounded Search Approach Better Protects Privacy in Today’s
Technological Advancements

With the advent of cloud-based storage, it has become critical to
protect information in the cloud from improper law enforcement search: the
bounded search approach is the only doctrine that does so. Instead of
accessing information stored on your smartphone or computer’s hard drive,
cloud computing allows the user to store and access data and programs over
the Internet. 153 In addition, cloud computing allows data from numerous
devices to be stored in one cloud. Thus, if an individual accesses the cloud
through the Internet from a smartphone, data that the user stored on the cloud
from other devices will appear.154 To be clear, this Article does not address
the third-party doctrine’s application of the Fourth Amendment to cloud
storage.155
A typical example of a cloud-based storage system is Google Drive.
Google Drive gives the user 15 gigabytes of free storage to upload photos,
drawings, videos, recordings, and essentially any type of data. 156 Google
Drive can be accessed from any smartphone, tablet, or computer. 157
Therefore, wherever users have access to the Internet, they can access the
files from their Google Drives. This means that photos uploaded from a
computer to Google Drive are accessible from a smartphone as long as the
Google Drive app is downloaded. 158 Therein lies the monumental clash
between cloud-based storage and the boundless search approach—applying
153
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the boundless search approach to devices using cloud-based storage can cause
disastrous privacy concerns. If a court adopts the boundless search approach,
law enforcement will be able to search everything on the phone instead of
merely replicating the private search. If law enforcement accesses the cloud
on a smartphone, they will have access, not only to what is on the
smartphone’s hard drive, but to everything that is uploaded to that
individual’s cloud. This means that law enforcement has within its reach data
that has been uploaded from a computer at home, a computer at work, or a
tablet, in addition to the smartphone held by law enforcement. In other words,
law enforcement would have access to devices that are completely separate
from the device that was searched by the private search via the cloud
application that is on that device.
However, if a court were to adopt the bounded search approach, law
enforcement would be limited to the scope of the private search. Therefore,
if the private search only covered the “Photos” album on the owner’s
smartphone, law enforcement would be strictly bounded to search only that
“Photos” album. The cloud would be off limits because it would be beyond
the scope of the private search. Even if the private searcher saw criminal
activity within the cloud, law enforcement would still be limited to searching
only the folder that the private searcher viewed. This protects the privacy of
the smartphone owner because the remainder of his cloud storage is off limits
to law enforcement. Essentially, the private searcher would need to view all
the files on that individual’s cloud for law enforcement to be legally allowed
to search the entire cloud as well.
The amount of data that can be stored within the cloud is immense.
Google Drive has 15 gigabytes of free storage, Dropbox has 2 gigabytes of
free storage, Box has 10 gigabytes of free storage, and OneDrive has 5
gigabytes of free storage. 159 These are only four of the numerous cloud
storage providers.160 In addition, all four of these providers also offer paid
cloud services. Google Drive offers 100 gigabytes for $2 per month or 1
terabyte for $10 per month and Dropbox offers 1 terabyte for $10 per
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month.161 Box offers 100 gigabytes for $10 per month and OneDrive offers
50 gigabytes for $2 per month.162 The amount of data that can be stored with
these cloud services is practically limitless, particularly with the fee-based
plans. With as many as 300 million users on Dropbox, 240 million users on
Google Drive, and 250 million users on OneDrive, it is vital that the privacy
of these users is protected from the overreach of law enforcement viewing
data that is unrelated to a private search.163
B.

Alternatively, a Severity of the Crime Approach Should be Adopted
by Courts When Applying the Private Search Doctrine

In the event that courts decline to adopt the bounded search approach,
this Article proposes an alternative test: courts should consider the severity
of the crime to determine when law enforcement may use the boundless
search approach. This new test is a good alternative to the bounded search
approach when it comes to protecting the individual’s privacy.
For example, if a private searcher goes through another’s smartphone
and finds a text message and photos of a small amount of marijuana
(indicating marijuana use or small-scale distribution) the crime is not severe
enough for law enforcement to use the boundless search approach. On the
other hand, if a private search of a smartphone reveals legitimate blueprints
of a terrorist attack, the crime is clearly severe enough to warrant the
boundless search approach and allow law enforcement to sift through the
entire smartphone’s contents.
Admittedly, this test is not without flaws. There is clearly a gray area
as to what crimes would be severe enough to merit the boundless approach.
The test is also heavily based on law enforcement’s judgment in deciding if
the crime meets the requisite severity level. However, this test still protects
individuals more than completely adopting the boundless search approach.
The test also balances the government’s interest in protecting society at large
against government overreach into one’s privacy. The governmental interest
of protecting society does not justify exceeding the scope of a private search
of a low-level marijuana dealer’s smartphone. The privacy right protected
outweighs the harm that is being prevented by exceeding the scope of the
161
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search. Furthermore, there are some guidelines that can help determine
whether crimes meet the severity level to validate a boundless search. For
example, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, otherwise
known as the Wiretap Act, prohibits unauthorized interception of wire, oral,
or electronic communications by government agencies and establishes
procedures for obtaining warrants to authorize wiretapping by the
government. 164 However, the Wiretap Act provides an exception to the
warrant requirement by allowing law enforcement to intercept
communications if it reasonably determines that an emergency situation
exists involving activities threatening national security. 165 Similarly, in
matters as severe as national security, law enforcement should apply the
boundless search approach to private searches. This provides extensive
protection of privacy for individuals, because most crimes do not rise to such
a level.
Ultimately, however, courts should adopt the bounded search
approach because it provides the highest protection to the data that is on the
owner’s device. Specifically, the bounded search approach is best suited for
technology that includes cloud-based storage. Adopting a pure boundless
search approach should be avoided at all costs due to the potential abuse by
law enforcement. Alternatively, if courts do not adopt the bounded search
approach, they should use the severity of the crime test proposed here to help
law enforcement determine when it would be reasonable to use the boundless
search approach. The severity of the crime test may create situations in which
the boundless search approach is still used, but it protects the owner’s privacy
in cases where the crime is not sufficiently severe.
CONCLUSION
Today’s society is heavily dependent on technology. The rise of
technology has presented serious problems regarding protection of privacy.
Currently, law enforcement can circumvent the Fourth Amendment in cases
where the private search doctrine applies, subject to one of the two
approaches represented in the current circuit split—the boundless search
approach and the bounded search approach. Under the boundless search
approach, the authorities can search the entire smartphone or computer,
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including cloud storage, once the device is searched privately in any way.
On the other hand, under the bounded search approach, the authorities can
only open the specific images or files that the private parties opened during
their search. In order to protect the “privacies of life” that smartphones hold,
the bounded approach should be adopted by all remaining circuits or by the
Supreme Court. Without the bounded search, law enforcement would have
unlimited access to the individual’s data that may be completely unrelated
to the private search, whether that data is stored on the smartphone,
computer, or in the cloud. As an alternative to the bounded search approach,
courts could use a severity of the crime test to determine when the
boundless search approach is reasonable, such as for matters of national
security. The “privacies of life” deserve the highest possible protection and
that protection can only be provided by the bounded search approach when
law enforcement circumvents the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
through the private search doctrine.

